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Introduction 
The aim of this article is to identify the funding streams that have been exploited by the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Levant.
1
  Since that time, ISIL has emerged as the largest terrorist 
group in the Middle East 
2
 and it has been described as “the wealthiest terrorist 
organisation”.3 In his evidence before the US House Committee on Financial Services, 
Matthew Levitt stated that “estimates put ISIL’s daily income at around $3m, giving its total 
value of assets between $1.3bn and $2bn, making it the world’s best-funded terrorist group.  
By this standard, ISIL draws more income than many small nations”.4  These figures were 
supported by Duhaime who noted that “by September 2014, ISIL had revenues of at least 
$2bn from internal and external sources”.5  It has also been suggested ISIL’s total assets 
exceed $2tn, with an annual income totaling $2.9bn.
6
  Furthermore, Humud et al stated that 
ISIL “approved a $2bn budget” for 2015.7  Therefore, an essential question that needs to be 
considered is how was ISIL able to access and control such vast sums of capital and income?  
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There is a clear answer to this question; ISIL is able to manipulate and abuse an 
unprecedented array of funding opportunities: the control of oil reserves, kidnapping for 
ransom, foreign and private benefactors and criminal activities.
8
   
Funding Stream 1: The Control of Oil Reserves 
One of the most distinctive and innovative financing streams used by ISIL involves “selling 
what they have captured. This includes oil sales to local consumers, the Syrian regime and 
black marketers as well as exporting crude oil to Turkey”.9  It appears that ISIL “has 
consolidated its grip on oil supplies in Iraq and presides over a sophisticated smuggling 
empire with illegal exports going to Turkey, Jordan and Iran”.10  ISIL has used the same 
smuggling methods and routes that were used by Saddam Hussein during the 1990s when the 
international community imposed sanctions that prevented the sale and purchase of oil by 
Iraq.
11
  Indeed, the Institute for Economics and Peace reported that ISIL manages dozens of 
oil fields and refineries in both Syria and Iraq that generate daily revenues between $1m and 
$3m.
12
  Conversely, it has been suggested that ISIL has been unable to maintain these 
revenues from the oil fields because it has lost control of two of the largest oil fields in Iraq, 
Kirkuk and Baiji.
13
  Furthermore, Humud et al noted that it would be extremely difficult to 
ISIL to sell oil on the open market and if they were to sell, it would be at a heavily discounted 
price.
14
  For example, it has been reported by Iraqi intelligence officials that ISIL has been 
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selling barrels of crude oil between $10 and $35.
15
  The international community has 
threatened to impose sanctions on countries that purchase oil from ISIL. However, the 
effectiveness of sanctions on this funding stream must be questioned.  If ISIL are able to 
freely smuggle oil into several neighbouring countries using the well-established smuggling 
routes and sell the oil below market prices, who will the sanctions be imposed on and will 
they have their desired impact?  The ineffectiveness of sanctions has resulted in nation states 
abandoning imposing financial sanctions and replacing them with targeted missile strikes on 
ISIL’s oil infrastructures. It is likely that the use of targeted missile strikes will continue on 
ISIL’s facilities following the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015.16 
Funding Stream 2: Kidnapping for Ransom 
 
Another funding avenue utilised by ISIL is kidnapping for ransom which has been described 
as the “most significant source of terrorist financing because it has proven itself to be 
frighteningly successful”.17  This has seen many nation states paying ISIL between $20m and 
$45m for the release of their citizens.
18
 The Congressional Research Services estimated that 
ISIL has amassed between $35m and $45m in ransom fees in 2014.
19
  It has even suggested 
ISIL has regularly earned $10m per month from ransom payments from foreign states and 
insurance companies.
20
  Therefore, kidnapping for ransom has become a major source of 
income for ISIL with “tens of millions of dollars paid by some European governments and 
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wealthy relatives of the kidnap victims over the past two years. The low end of the estimate 
range is well above $25m”.21  It is interesting to note that the countries that have paid 
ransoms include Germany, France,
22
 Italy and Spain.
23
  Conversely, the making of such 
payments violates the criminal law in both the United States of America 
24
 and the United 
Kingdom.
25
  It is important to note that the UK government has not brought a successful 
prosecution against families or third parties for paying a ransom since the court ruled that a 
ransom payment was not illegal.
26
  Kidnapping for ransom payments have been made despite 
the approval of UN Security Council Resolution 2133 which stated that ransom payments to 
terrorists are counter-productive.
27
  The impact of Resolution 2133 on the ability of ISIL to 
obtain monies from kidnappings for ransom will be negligible.  The position is further 
complicated as some of the countries permitted to make ransom payments under domestic 
legislation.   
 
Funding Stream 3: Foreign and Private Financial Benefactors 
ISIL are also able to acquire finances from foreign investors and private benefactors.  The 
Financial Action Task Force stated that ISIL receives funding from private donations or via 
non-profit organisations, thus adopting a similar funding strategy as al Qaeda.
28
  The US 
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Department of the Treasury has described Kuwait as the “epicentre of fundraising for terrorist 
groups in Syria”.29  Sympathetic supporters in other countries including Jordan, Syria and 
Saudi Arabia have also provided ISIL with financial support.
30
  David Cohen of the 
Department of Treasury took the view that ISIL “derives some funding from wealthy 
donors”31 and it been estimated that ISIL has collected up to $40m from private donors in 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait.
32
  However, it has been suggested that the amount of 
funding provided by private sponsors from has “diminished and is at most only a tiny 
percentage of the total income that flows into ISIL coffers in 2014”.33   
Funding Stream 4: Criminal Activities 
The final funding stream exploited by ISIL also includes criminal activities.  For example, 
this includes the imposition of illegal taxation measures which raises approximately $360m 
per year.
34
 Furthermore, one of the largest funding avenues exploited by ISIL has been the 
sale of antiquities.
35
 It has been noted that almost a third of Iraq’s archaeological sites are 
controlled by ISIS and the sale of artefacts has become ISIL’s second largest funding stream.   
The Wall Street Journal estimated that the sale of antiquities provides ISIL with 
approximately $100m per year.
36
 Duhaime concluded that “the persons financing ISIS … are 
art dealers from the UK, Switzerland and Germany, who buy several antiquities in bulk … 
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for €500,000 or €1m”.37 Levitt stated that “while it is nearly impossible to estimate the total 
profits of selling these artefacts, it is known that one lion sculpture from the region sold for 
more than $50 million in New York in 2007.  Most of ISIS’s captured historical gems have 
not been publicized, but could fetch similarly hefty sums”.38  In February 2015, the United 
Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2199, which prohibited the trade of artefacts 
illegally removed from Syria (since 2011) and Iraq (since 1990).
39
  The Department of 
Treasury stated that ISIL has gained a significant amount of revenue from criminal activities 
including robbery and extortion.
40
  They added that ISIL has been able to “generate a portion 
of its extortion-derived proceeds from Iraqi and Syrian oil resource”.41  Indeed, it has been 
suggested that ISIL receives most of its funding from “extortion … and the group extorted 
taxes from businesses … netting upwards of $8m a month”.42  Further evidence that supports 
the contention that ISIL obtains its funding from criminal enterprises was afforded by Levitt 
who stated that “unlike al Qaeda, ISIS has been financially self-sufficient for at least eight 
years by virtue of engaging in tremendously successful criminal activity enterprises … ISIS 
engages in a wide range of criminal activities”.43  Another criminal activity used by ISIL was 
illustrated in June 214 when it “raided Mosul’s central bank and other smaller banks … [and 
it] made off with as much as $400m in currency and gold bullion”.44 It has been reported that 
since the ISIS takeover of Mosul in June 2014, they have stolen an estimated $425m from its 
Central Bank.   At the time of writing this article, it has been suggested that banks operating 
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in the Nineveh province, which ISIL, have a cumulative cash balance exceeding $1bn.
45
  
However, it has been noted that the speculative claims about the amount of money ISIL 
seized are untrue.
46
  Other illegal activities that have been used by ISIL include material 
support provided by foreign terrorist fighters 
47
 and through modern communication 
networks.
48
  The unprecedented evolution of the funding streams of ISIL is also illustrated by 
the creation of its own currency.
49
 Duhaime noted that “ISIL has issued its own currency in 
two gold coins, three silver coins and two bronze coins, minted with Islamic State with 
approved imagery”.50  The aim of the currency is to enable ISIL to “emancipate itself from 
the satanic global economic system”.51  The development of a currency by a terrorist group is 
an unparalleled development in the financing of terrorism.   
 
Lessons Learnt 
ISIL is an extremely well-funded terrorist group that has become reminiscent of al Qaeda in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s.
52
 However, its financial position belittles that of al Qaeda and 
other terrorist groups and that it has now become “a profitable multinational criminal 
organisation and terrorist group”.53  Indeed, ISIL is not only the best equipped terrorist group, 
but also the best funded terrorist group.  It has more financial wealth than al Qaeda ever 
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had.
54
  The Department of Treasury stated that “ISIL is a different terrorist financing 
challenge. It has amassed wealth of an unprecedented pace, and its revenue sources are 
different from those of many other terrorist organisations”.55  Saltman and Winter took the 
view that “ISIL is light years ahead of other jihadist groups … this is most true with regards 
to the means by which the group is financed”.56  If these reports are accurate, and that ISIL 
earns approximately $1m per day, this terrorist organisation has the financial capability to 
operate for many years and it can be regarded as the “richest terrorist group on the planet”.57 
It is extremely important to note that ISIL’s funding model is extremely flexible and 
adaptable.  For example, it has been suggested that ISIL have actively sought not [authors 
emphasis] to repeat the mistakes made by al Qaeda.
58
  Humud et al stated that ISIL 
“compiled a list of lessons learned, based on what they perceived as al Qaeda’s failures in 
Iraq … [there] was a critique of its use of financial resources, describing a failure to distribute 
funding among local cells effectively and the lack of a regular funding source, particularly, a 
foreign state sponsor”.59  There is no clear answer to how much funding ISIL has or even if 
the statistical data provided above is accurate.  It is only when ISIL’s controlled economies 
has been regained that we are likely to see a marginal impact on the funding streams of this 
terrorist organisation. 
Conclusion 
ISIL can be classified as a self-sufficient non-state terrorist organisation that has thrived on 
the political uncertainty and insecurity in Iraq and Syria.  The impact of the counter-terrorist 
financing measures and the ‘Financial War on Terrorism’ on the funding activities of ISIL 
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will be limited.  For example, how would it be possible for national states to prosecute the 
financiers of ISIL?  Only one person has been convicted of attempting to provide funding for 
ISIL in the UK.
60
 The UN has imposed sanctions and travel restrictions on a number of 
named individuals linked to ISIL.
61
  However, how will sanctions limit the ability of a private 
financier to financially support ISIL? In order to tackle the funding avenues of ISIL, it is 
essential that the international community and all nation states fully implement the ‘Financial 
War on Terrorism’ and attempt to ascertain an improved understanding of how this terrorist 
entity operates.  All financial institutions should redouble their efforts to ensure that they do 
not act as conduits in the movement of finances associated with ISIL.  This is heavily 
dependent on how nation states draft, implement and enforce their domestic counter-terrorist 
financing laws, an area that needs to be consistently monitored by the Financial Action Task 
Force.  Local nation states must also increase their efforts to limit the smuggling of oil 
through the well-established smuggling routes used by ISIL.  ISIL is the largest threat to the 
‘Financial War on Terrorism’ its financial infrastructure is significantly more advanced than 
any other known terrorist organization.  Therefore, the existing counter-terrorist financing 
measures and the ‘Financial War on Terrorism’ is not fit for purpose and is unable to limit the 
funding avenues of ISIL.   
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